Without pack files, each repository chunk is stored as a separate borgstore object. For large repositories this means millions of individual objects, each requiring its own I/O round trip to read or write. On high-latency backends (SFTP, cloud object storage) this overhead dominates backup and restore times.
Pack files address this by grouping multiple chunks into a single store object. A reader that needs one chunk does a partial read (range request) at a known offset instead of fetching a separate file. Store object count drops from one-per-chunk to one-per-pack.
There is no separate file header. Each blob starts with the 8-byte OBJ_MAGIC
(BORG_OBJ), so a forward scanner can locate blob boundaries and identify
each chunk using only the pack file bytes with no external index.
Each blob is a self-contained unit:
Offset (relative to blob start) Size Type Field
-------------------------------- ---------------- ------- -----
0 len(OBJ_MAGIC) bytes OBJ_MAGIC = ASCII b"BORG_OBJ"
8 1 uint8 Format version: 0x02 (0x01 still readable)
9 32 bytes chunk_id
41 4 uint32le meta_size
45 4 uint32le data_size
49 meta_size bytes encrypted_meta
49 + meta_size data_size bytes encrypted_data
chunk_id is the ID hash of the plaintext data (id_hash(plaintext_data)).
Storing it in the unencrypted header lets a scanner rebuild the
chunk_id → location index without decrypting any blob.
chunk_id is not duplicated into encrypted_meta: the header is its only
place in the object. RepoObj.format() puts the object type and the compression
bookkeeping into the meta dict (type, ctype, clevel, csize, size,
plus psize/olevel when the obfuscate pseudo compressor is used), nothing
else. What keeps the plaintext header copy honest is that it is bound into the
authentication of both encrypted slots, see below.
The fixed part of each blob header is 49 bytes (REPOOBJ_HEADER_SIZE):
len(OBJ_MAGIC) + 1 version + 32 chunk_id + 4 meta_size + 4 data_size.
REPOOBJ_HEADER_SIZE = len(OBJ_MAGIC) + 1 + 32 + 4 + 4 = 49
Format version 0x02 (OBJ_VERSION_HEADER_AAD) binds the header’s first 41 bytes (OBJ_MAGIC
+ version + chunk_id -- REPOOBJ_HEADER_AAD_SIZE) into the authentication of
encrypted_meta and encrypted_data as additional authenticated data (AAD: data that is
authenticated together with the ciphertext, but not itself encrypted). This applies to all borg 2
modes: the AEAD encryption modes (AES-256-OCB, ChaCha20-Poly1305) authenticate it with their AEAD
tag, the authenticated-* modes with their MAC and the none-* modes with their (unkeyed)
checksum, see Modes without encryption. meta_size and data_size are excluded from
the AAD; tampering with either still fails the check, because it changes the length of the
slice being read. A forged chunk_id, version, or magic byte therefore fails
authentication in RepoObj.parse()/parse_meta().
encrypted_meta and encrypted_data each add a one-byte slot tag on top of the shared header
AAD -- b"M" for encrypted_meta, b"D" for encrypted_data -- binding each ciphertext to
its slot. This stops an attacker controlling repo storage from swapping the two ciphertexts (adjusting
meta_size/data_size to match): decrypting a ciphertext under the wrong slot’s AAD fails
authentication.
Format version 0x01 (OBJ_VERSION_NO_HEADER_AAD) authenticates encrypted_meta and
encrypted_data with aad=chunk_id only, without the header bound in. RepoObj.format()
writes version 0x02; parse()/parse_meta() accept both versions.
iter_headers() (used for pack recovery/compaction, see below) reads the header without
decrypting, so it does not check header AAD authentication.
The fixed 49-byte blob header. meta_size and data_size drive
traversal; integrity comes from the content-addressed pack name and the
per-blob tag, which authenticates magic/version/chunk_id as additional
authenticated data.¶
A reader locates the next blob by advancing:
next_blob_offset = current_blob_offset + REPOOBJ_HEADER_SIZE + meta_size + data_size
The per-blob magic limits the blast radius of corrupted length fields: if
meta_size or data_size is damaged, the scanner loses at most one blob.
Once it finds the next OBJ_MAGIC sequence it resumes. Other corruption
(payload bit flips) is caught by AEAD on that blob without losing position.
Blobs follow one another contiguously with no padding:
OBJ_MAGIC | version=0x02 | chunk_id_0 | meta_size_0 | data_size_0 | encrypted_meta_0 | encrypted_data_0
OBJ_MAGIC | version=0x02 | chunk_id_1 | meta_size_1 | data_size_1 | encrypted_meta_1 | encrypted_data_1
...
A pack file: self-describing objects concatenated back to back. Object
boundaries are found by walking each 49-byte header
(offset += 49 + meta_size + data_size).¶
The pack ID is the SHA-256 of the pack file’s bytes:
pack_id = sha256(pack_bytes)
Content-addressing the file by its own bytes makes the name commit to the
content, so borgstore can verify and cache it and borg check can detect
silent corruption of the stored file.
Pack files are stored under the packs/ namespace in borgstore, using a
single directory level keyed on the first byte of the pack ID (hex-encoded):
packs/
00/ .. ff/
<pack_id_hex>
A pack usually holds many blobs, so locating a chunk needs which pack it is in, where inside that pack its blob starts, and how long the blob is. The ChunkIndex maps each chunk to a full pack location:
chunk_id → (..., pack_id, obj_offset, obj_size)
obj_offset is the byte offset of the blob from the start of the pack file and
obj_size is the total blob length (header + encrypted_meta + encrypted_data).
A reader fetches a single chunk with one range request:
read packs/<hex(pack_id)> at [obj_offset, obj_offset + obj_size)
The full ChunkIndex entry is (flags, size, pack_id, obj_offset, obj_size)
(ChunkIndexEntry in borg.hashindex), where size is the plaintext
chunk size. While a chunk is buffered in the pack writer but not yet flushed, its
entry carries the F_PENDING flag and its pack location is unresolved.
The archive pointer write (archives/<archive_id>) is the commit point; a
crash before it leaves only unreferenced objects that borg compact
reclaims.¶
Pack data must be stored before any archive pointer references it. The required write order is:
Store the pack files to packs/<pack_id> via borgstore. The archive metadata
object goes into a (usually tiny) pack of its own, stored last.
Store index fragment(s) covering all objects the session stored -- the archive
metadata object included -- to index/<index_id> (see Index Namespace).
Write the archive pointer archives/<hex(archive_id)>. This pointer write is
the sole commit point.
A crash between steps 1 and 2 leaves orphan pack files in packs/. No archive
references these chunks; borg compact removes them on the next run.
A crash between steps 2 and 3 leaves a partial index file covering packs not yet
committed to any archive. The extra index entries point to valid, fully-written pack
data; they are harmless and will be cleaned up by the next borg compact.
A crash after step 3 cannot leave the repository in an inconsistent state. The
archive pointer write is the commit point: archives are listed from the
archives/ namespace, so data not referenced by any archive pointer is
unreachable and treated as garbage by borg compact.
Pack files are removed by borg compact (dropping packs whose indexed objects are
all unused, rewriting packs above --threshold and merging tiny packs),
borg check --repair (when it drops a defective object), borg repo-compress
(Repository.transform_pack stores the re-compressed pack under its new
content-addressed name and deletes the old one) and borg debug delete-obj. A
single blob cannot be removed from a pack in place: all of these paths write a new
pack file without it and then delete the old one, so store-level deletion always
operates at pack granularity.
Chunk-to-location mappings are stored as a separate set of objects under the
index/ namespace, called index fragments.
A fragment is a serialized ChunkIndex (a borghash HashTableNT keyed on
chunk_id) holding only the pack location; the flags and the plaintext size
of each entry are zeroed before serializing. Fragments are not encrypted: they map
chunk_id to (pack_id, obj_offset, obj_size), which anyone with access to the
repository could equally well read out of the unencrypted blob headers (see
Recovery Path). A fragment’s name is the SHA-256 digest of its own content:
index/
<sha256_of_content_hex>
An ordinary backup writes only the entries that are new in that session; a full
rewrite (e.g. by borg compact) writes all of them. In both cases the write is
split into fragments of at most CHUNKINDEX_FRAGMENT_ENTRIES_MAX (400000 entries,
roughly 32MB), so no single fragment gets too large -- not even the one large write a
first backup of a big dataset produces. The split selects and sorts the keys one
leading-key-bits partition at a time, so the same set of entries always yields the
same fragments, no matter in which order the entries were inserted.
Content-addressed naming makes each fragment self-verifying and idempotent: writing the same index data twice produces the same name, and such a write is skipped.
Index fragments are write-once; an existing fragment is never modified. The in-memory
ChunkIndex is built lazily, on the first access to Repository.chunks: everything
under index/ is listed, loaded, checked against its content hash and merged
(build_chunkindex_from_repo). The merge is commutative and idempotent; order does
not matter. It has to succeed for all fragments or not at all, because a partially
merged index would be missing chunks that do exist in the repository: a fragment that
vanishes mid-merge (a concurrent consolidation replaced it) restarts the merge, and a
persistently unreadable one falls back to the rebuild from the pack files.
Because every backup appends a fragment, small fragments would pile up over time.
repack_chunkindex() (run at cache close, and by anything that loads the index and
persists it, e.g. borg compact) merges the fragments below
CHUNKINDEX_FRAGMENT_ENTRIES_MIN (100000 entries, roughly 8MB) into fragments of up
to CHUNKINDEX_FRAGMENT_ENTRIES_MAX entries and deletes the small sources.
Fragments already within that range are left untouched, so they stay immutable -- and,
once index/ is cache-backed, stay cached for every client, instead of being
invalidated by an all-in-one consolidation. The merge is deferred until it can seal at
least one full fragment, or until more than CHUNKINDEX_SMALL_FRAGMENT_CAP (15)
small fragments have accumulated, so a slowly growing fragment is not rewritten on
every backup.
borg compact rewrites the index/ namespace as a whole: it determines the live
chunks via mark-and-sweep, writes the complete surviving index as bounded fragments,
and deletes all the fragments it supersedes.
A deletion that could drop entries -- dropping the index entirely, or the full rewrite
above -- is guarded by a marker object, cache/chunkindex-invalid, written before
the first deletion and removed after the last one. While the marker is present,
leftover fragments could be an incomplete index, so they are not merged; the index is
rebuilt from the pack files on the next load instead. A consolidation needs no marker:
the entries of the small fragments it deletes are already contained in the merged
fragments it wrote before deleting them.
If the entire index/ namespace is lost or corrupt, the ChunkIndex can be rebuilt
by scanning pack files directly; see Recovery Path.
The ChunkIndex can always be reconstructed by forward-scanning all pack files in
packs/. The archives phase of borg check --repair does that unconditionally
(it has to work from the real packs, so it can find archives referencing chunks whose
pack has gone missing), and the same rebuild is the fallback whenever the index/
fragments cannot be loaded completely (see Index Namespace).
Each blob’s unencrypted header supplies the OBJ_MAGIC (for re-sync after
corruption), the chunk_id, and the size fields needed to locate the next blob.
The scan produces a complete chunk_id → (pack_id, offset, length) mapping
without decrypting any blob and without the repository key.
Repositories using pack files require repository version 4, and the version is the only gate for the pack format.
Repository.create() stores 4 as the config/version store object.
Repository.open() reads it back and, if it is not in
Repository.acceptable_repo_versions (currently (4,)), closes the store again
and raises InvalidRepositoryConfig -- before any repository data is read. A borg
version that only accepts version 3 rejects a version 4 repository the same way, so
the version bump alone locks out every client that does not know about packs.
Borg does have a feature flag mechanism for locking out clients more selectively
(Manifest.check_repository_compatibility(), fed from a feature_flags entry in
the manifest config -- see The manifest), but it currently defines no flags at
all: Manifest.SUPPORTED_REPO_FEATURES is the empty set, and no borg code writes a
feature_flags entry. On a repository borg creates, the compatibility check is
therefore a no-op; there is in particular no pack_files feature flag.
There is no migration path from version 3 repositories to version 4. Users of the
version 3 beta format must create a new repository with borg repo-create.